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This study empirically examines the relationships between a firm’s takeover defenses and its
ownership structure and stock returns. Analyzing data of Dutch listed companies, we find that
multiple antitakeover defenses are increasingly adopted when firms are characterized by
relatively lower ownership concentration. The evidence supports the hypothesis that more
concentrated ownership of shares provides more effective monitoring of managers. As defense
by issuing preferred share has recently been the most widely adopted mechanism in the
Netherlands, its impact on shareholders’ wealth is also analyzed. We observe the presence of
two opposing effects of this antitakeover measure.  1997 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
INTRODUCTION tually the whole population of Dutch listed
industrial companies which have adopted multiple
defense mechanisms.Hostile takeover bids are rare in the Netherlands,
and were successful, at most, on a few occasions. The issue of corporate governance is also inter-
esting in an international setting because it differsThe reason is that stock exchange listed compa-
nies are protected by multiple takeover defenses. from country to country. For example, there is
an active takeover market in the U.S.A. and theAround the turn of the twentieth century, defense
mechanisms started to be used to protect Dutch U.K., but this is not so in many other countries.
There, as for example, shareholders are con-corporations from foreign influences. Later on,
they were applied to restrict the power of com- sidered to be one group of stakeholders in a firm
next to employees, suppliers and customers. Themon shareholders. The use of defense measures
to repel corporate raids and unfriendly takeovers equity ownership is also concentrated in the hands
of a few investors. Although the pattern of cross-has become more important since the 1960s, and
has received both criticism and support from shareholdings in German and Japanese companies
may look similar, the governance structures arevarious interest groups. Public corporations have
been devoting time and resources toward quite dissimilar. German firms have close
relationships with banks which supply both equitydeveloping diverse tactics to defend against
unfriendly takeovers. As a result, the external capital and debt. In contrast, Japanese firms are
characterized by large industrial groups withmarket for corporate control plays a diminished
disciplinary role in the Netherlands. An issue interlocking directorships. Hostile takeovers are
virtually nonexistent in Germany and the Nether-deserving investigation is under what circum-
stances this disciplinary mechanism becomes inef- lands, but due to two different reasons. Extensive
cross-shareholdings provide German companiesfective. To address this issue, we investigate vir-
with a strong defense, while Dutch companies
are protected by multiple antitakeover devices.
These and other differences imply that the influ-Key words: corporate governance; ownership struc-
ture; takeover defense ence of various disciplinary mechanisms will vary
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from country to country. The takeover market is ownership concentration and takeover defense
measures.1a relatively more important disciplinary mechan-
ism in the U.S.A. and the U.K. But, for Germany Incentives as well as the degree of monitoring
can vary depending on the stakes and the typesand the Netherlands, concentrated ownership and
supervisory boards exert a relatively more of shareholders. One may be interested to know
how institutional shareholders, as a separateimportant role. Various antitakeover measures are
adopted in the U.S.A. to protect the interests of group, affect corporate decision making. These
investors—usually banks, insurance companies,shareholders during takeover bids. But, in the
Netherlands these measures are primarily directed pension funds and mutual funds—are expected
to play a more active role in the affairs of ato limit the power of common shareholders.
A vast literature addresses the interrelationship company. They are in a better position to invest
resources for increased monitoring so that man-between ownership structure and different corpo-
rate governance devices. Walsh and Seward agement’s inclination to adopt defense mech-
anisms decreases. On the other hand, some insti-(1990) examine different internal and external
mechanisms of corporate control used in aligning tutional investors may align with management
because of commercial ties and profitable busi-the diverse interests of managers and share-
holders. Important internal control mechanisms ness opportunities. The role actually played by
institutional shareholders, therefore, becomes aninclude the control function of the board of direc-
tors, competition within the managerial team, and empirical issue.2
Although it has been argued that large share-the monitoring role of large shareholders. The
external control mechanisms, on the other hand, holders who are effective monitors will prevent
managers from adopting defensive measures, oneare the market for corporate control and the
competition in the product market. Walsh and can not be sure if shareholders in general are
harmed by such adoptions. In fact, adoption ofSeward (1990) argue that the failure of one con-
trol mechanism triggers the presence of another takeover defenses is usually explained under two
competing hypotheses (DeAngelo and Rice, 1983;mechanism. Studies by Jarrell and Poulsen
(1987), Ambrose and Megginson (1992), and Mahoney and Mahoney, 1993). According to the
managerial entrenchment hypothesis, defenseGordon and Pound (1993) also suggest that dif-
ferences in firms’ ownership structure (internal measures primarily protect poorly functioning
management by reducing the probability of poten-control aspect) can explain observed variations in
antitakeover defenses (external control aspect). tial takeover. These measures help incumbent
management to abuse their power by acting inThe notion can be illustrated in the following
way. their own interest at the expense of shareholders.
On the other hand, the shareholder interestShareholders with large stakes are expected to
participate actively in managerial decision making hypothesis postulates that adoption of defense
measures allows current management to focus on(Demsetz, 1983; Shleifer and Vishny, 1986).
They will not in their own interest allow man- long-term strategies of the firm while remaining
protected from the worry of hostile takeovers.agers to adopt defensive measures, as disciplining
will be more difficult. The same is true for large Through a strong negotiating position, managers
can also help shareholders to obtain abut passive shareholders who will also try to
resist any attempt by managers to adopt defenses. fairer/higher premium if a takeover does take
place.This is because any future possibility of gain
through facilitating a third-party takeover will Empirical studies from the U.S.A. document
then be reduced. Shareholders with small hold-
ings, on the other hand, may not take an active 1 Although several studies have examined empirically the
relationship between equity ownership and firm value (e.g.,interest in monitoring management, perhaps
McConnell and Servaes, 1990; Slovin and Sushka, 1993),because of the ‘free-rider’ problem. Defense mea-
limited attention has been given to explore ownership concen-
sures are then relatively easily adopted by man- tration vis-a`-vis multiple defense measures.
2 Empirical evidence on the mixed role of institutional share-agers because there are no large shareholders to
holders can be observed from different studies, such as Agra-counteract management’s attempt. The purpose of
wal and Mandelker (1990), Bhagat and Jefferis (1991), Brick-the study is, therefore, to test empirically this ley, Lease, and Smith (1988), Duggal and Millar (1994),
Pound (1988), Shivdasani (1993) and Van Nuys (1993).theoretically predicted relationship between firms’
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that while some defense mechanisms are harmful systems (Franks and Mayer, 1990). Moerland
(1995) distinguishes two basic types of corporatefor shareholders, others are not.3 This study,
therefore, reexamines the valuation impact of systems: the market-oriented system (prevailing
in the U.S.A. and the U.K.) and the network-defense measures, using the Dutch data. If share-
holders of Dutch companies interpret the adoption oriented system (prevailing in, for example, the
Netherlands, Germany, France and Japan). Theof defense measures as managerial entrenchment,
stock prices should decline. Alternatively, if these former is characterized by relatively developed
financial markets, large-scale presence of corpora-measures allow management to bargain for a
higher takeover premium, share prices should tions with widely dispersed ownership, and active
markets for corporate control. The latter system,increase.
The wealth effect of defense measures needs on the other hand, features closely held corpora-
tions, group membership of corporations, and sub-to be examined in conjunction with the ownership
structure of firms. Jarrell and Poulsen (1987) stantial involvement of banks in corporate financ-
ing and corporate control. These differences indocument that value-reducing takeover defenses
are adopted by firms with larger insider holdings governance systems are also reflected in differ-
ences in adoption of specific defense devices.and smaller institutional holdings. McWilliams
(1990) finds that defense measures induce posi- There exist a variety of ways to classify take-
over defenses. These can be either structural ortive effects on shareholder wealth for firms with
low insider share ownership. Agrawal and Man- technical. The first type arises from prevailing
structures of stock market and equity ownershipdelker (1990) report that the effect is more favor-
able the larger the level of institutional ownership. (e.g., relative importance of debt financing, cross-
holdings). The second type of defenses areSong and Walkling (1993) find that managerial
ownership is related both to the probability of specifically directed to impede hostile takeover
attempts (e.g., issuing preferred defense shares,being a takeover target and to increments in target
shareholder returns. Given these findings, we limiting voting power). According to one study,4
structural barriers to takeovers are relativelyexamine if the shareholders wealth effect of take-
over defenses is related to ownership structure. strong in Italy, France, Germany and Switzerland,
and of medium strength in Spain and Sweden, butThe remainder of the paper is organized as
follows. Important takeover defense measures are weak in the Netherlands and the U.K. Technical
measures, on the other hand, are relatively strongfirst discussed with particular emphasis on those
prevailing in the Netherlands. The following two in the Netherlands, Germany and Switzerland, of
medium strength in Italy, France, Spain andsections describe the sample and the method-
ology. The results are presented in the next sec- Sweden, and weak in the U.K.
Defense mechanisms are also classified accord-tion. A brief summary of the study and the
research implications are presented in the final ing to shareholders’ approval (Ruback, 1988).
Some defenses require shareholders’ approvalsection.
before adoption. These include super-majority
provisions, fair-price amendments and classified
boards. Other measures may be adopted by man-TAKEOVER DEFENSE MEASURES
agement without requiring shareholders’ approval.
Examples include poison pills and targetedTakeover defense measures help to make acqui-
sition of a company more difficult, if not impos- share repurchases.
The Dutch situation offers companies numeroussible, and thereby serve to insulate managers
from the free market for corporate control. These possibilities of defense mechanisms, many of
which do not exist in the U.S.A. These includemeasures vary from country to country depending
on institutional features and corporate governance (a) legal measures such as the creation of struc-
ture companies (‘structuur vennootschappen’); (b)
statutory measures such as issuing preferred3 DeAngelo and Rice (1983) and Jarrell and Poulsen (1987)
find an insignificant price effect; Linn and McConnell (1983)
find a weak positive effect; and Jarrell and Poulsen (1988),
Mahoney and Mahoney (1993), Malatesta and Walkling 4 Effect of ‘Bangeman Proposal’ on Barriers to Takeovers in
the European Community, Coopers & Lybrand Management(1988) and Ryngaert (1988) find a significant negative share
price effect. Consultants, Amsterdam, 1990.
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defense shares, issuing priority shares, making company management to issue preferred shares
whenever necessary and thus, grant substantialbinding appointments of directors and limiting
voting power per shareholder; and (c) nonstatu- voting power to another entity.
The procedure of defense with preferred sharestory measures such as the issue of depository
receipts of shares (‘certificaten van aandelen’). takes place in three consecutive steps. First, com-
mon shareholders approve the necessary charterSome important features of these antitakeover
devices are explained below. amendment to create the possibility of issuing
preferred shares. Second, company managementThe law on ‘structure companies’ compels a
large firm to establish a ‘supervisory board’ grants the option to a friendly party—usually a
specially created foundation and/or an insti-(consisting of outsiders and different interest
group representatives). This board (thus, not the tutional investor. Third, management decides to
issue preferred share. This usually happens whenshareholders of the company) in turn appoints a
‘management board’ to run day-to-day affairs of there is a fear of unfriendly takeover attempt.
These three steps follow one after another, butthe firm. Many decisions of the ‘management
board’, such as adoption of annual accounts, do not necessarily take place simultaneously. A
company may create the possibility to issue pre-investment plans and company restructuring,
require approval of the ‘supervisory board’, which ferred defense shares at a certain point of time,
while the shares are actually issued several yearsmeets on a few occasions per year. Priority shares
are issued to a friendly foundation which reserves later (depending on any threat of hostile
takeover).the right to approve any amendment of a com-
pany’s charter. Therefore, the power of the gen-
eral meeting of common shareholders is restricted.
The approval of priority shareholders is also DATA
needed for decisions such as hiring or firing of
company directors and issuing new common Inspired by the European Community initiative,
shareholders with holdings of 5 percent or moreshares. Depository receipts are issued by an
administrative office to investors after detaching in Dutch listed companies have been required to
disclose their holdings publicly since Februarythe voting rights from ordinary shares. The holder
of depository receipts has all economic rights 1992. Before that, there was no mandatory dis-
closure of share ownership, and no way existedattached to common shares, except for the voting
right (which rests with the administrative office). even to identify shareholders.5 The data on block-
holdings are collected from the Dutch financialBinding appointments of new directors are made
by the management board, thereby strengthening daily Het Financieele Dagblad. In total, we
obtained a sample of 177 companies listed ontheir own control. Ordinary shareholders are, thus,
deprived of the possibility to appoint their own the Amsterdam Stock Exchange. These companies
represent more than 90 percent of the Dutch stockdirectors. Only a two-third majority at the share-
holders meeting can overrule the binding appoint- market capitalization. Data on takeover defense
measures associated with these companies arement. Limited voting power mechanism restricts
the maximum number of votes that can be cast collected from Voogd (1989) and other publi-
cations. Our findings are presented in Tables 1by one shareholder, regardless of the number of
shares actually held. and 2.
Table 1 shows that more than 90 percent ofBesides the above-mentioned takeover defen-
ses, the issue of preferred defense shares is the Dutch companies are protected by at least one
defense measure. We find that while only 16most widely adopted defense mechanism in the
Netherlands. These shares are issued in the name (9%) companies are without any of these defen-
ses, 52 (29%) companies have one defense mech-of the holder (usually friendly parties) because
of their control function, with only the statutory anism, 62 (35%) firms have two defense mech-
anisms, and as many as 47 (27%) firms areminimum of 25 percent of par value to be paid
up. Even though they are not fully paid up, protected by three or more defense devices.
preferred shares have the same voting rights as
common shares. In order to resist any unfriendly 5 Public corporations in the Netherlands issue predominantly
bearer shares.takeover attempt, common stockholders authorize
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Table 1. Number of takeover defenses adopted by Out of the 52 announcements of defense with
Dutch companies preferred shares during 1984–90, we select a
sample of 47 to analyze shareholder wealthNo. of measures No. of firms %
effect.6 The sample is further divided into three
groups based on the announcement of three steps0 16 9.1
followed during the issuing process. The statutory1 52 29.4
2 62 35.0 possibility to defend with preferred shares was
3 39 22.0 created for the first time during 1984–90 by 17
4 8 4.5 companies. During the same period, theTotal 177 100
announcement of granting an option allowing
friendly parties to own preferred shares was made
by 12 companies (these 12 companies have taken
the first step either during 1984–90 or earlier).Table 2. Distribution of different takeover defenses
Finally, during the period of our investigation,
Official Parallel Total there were 18 companies which actually
marketa marketa announced the issue of preferred shares.
We collect daily share price data from Data-
Total number of firms: 141 36 177
stream. These are adjusted for stock splits and
other capital changes. We also adjust for cashPriority shares 63 16 79 dividends and then compute continuously com-Preferred shares 89 16 105
pounded stock returns for the analysis.Binding appointment 49 15 64
Limited voting power 7 0 7
Depository receipts 41 19 70
METHODOLOGY
aThe official market is the first-tier market for larger compa-
nies, while the parallel market is for smaller companies.
We first divide the aggregate sample into groups
with cumulative takeover defense measures, and
then determine the average ownership concen-Table 2 presents a list of widely used antitakeover
measures in the Netherlands. We find that 105 tration for each group. We calculate ownership
concentration of a firm in several ways: the per-(32%) firms have adopted defense mechanism
with preferred shares, 79 (24%) firms have issued centage of shares held by the largest blockholder7
(C1), the share of the three largest blockholderspriority shares, 70 (22%) companies have issued
depository receipts, 64 (20%) firms have made (C3), and the share of all blockholders (Cblock).
We also separately calculate a concentration mea-binding appointments of directors, and seven
(2%) companies have imposed restrictions on sure (Cinst. ) to represent institutional ownership
(estimated by blockholdings held by major Dutchvoting rights.
After searching sources like the stock exchange banks and insurance companies). On the basis of
a t-test we then find out whether average owner-publication Beursplein 5 and the financial daily
Het Financieele Dagblad, we find that 79 new ship concentration significantly varies among
groups of companies with different takeoverdefense mechanisms were announced by Dutch
companies during 1984–90. Defense with pre- defenses.
The above analysis is performed by comparingferred share was the most frequently announced
mechanism—on 52 occasions, which represents two sample averages at a time. In order to exam-
ine the effect of firms’ ownership structure on66% of the total. The next most important anti-
takeover devices were the issues of priority shares the likelihood of adopting individual takeover
and depository receipts. Both were adopted on
seven occasions each. No new defense measure
was announced during 1991–92 because of
6 We could not find a definitive announcement date for tworestrictions imposed by the Amsterdam Stock
companies; three companies were closely involved in a mergerExchange. Many companies accelerated the adop-
or takeover.tion of new antitakover devices before the restric- 7 Blockholders are owners of 5 percent or more of the out-
standing equity.tion took effect.
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ejt = the error term of stock j in period t.defense, we estimate the following logistic
regression:8
The period to estimate the Market Model para-
meters is selected as the period of 100 daysp (defense measure) = f (ownership
concentration) before the start of the event (or announcement)
period. We also estimate the parameters using
100 days of data from the postevent period. AHere the dependent variable is equal to 1 if a
firm has a particular defense measure and 0 other- period of 20 days before the announcement until
20 days after the announcement is selected as thewise. Several new proxies are used to calculate
ownership concentration. In addition to the four event period. The impact of takeover defense
announcements on stock returns is measured overconcentration measures defined earlier, we use
the logarithmic transformation of these variables this period. The parameters are estimated by using
the ordinary least squares method. We use theas well as the Herfindahl measure of concen-
tration in the regression analysis.9 ‘CBS-Total Return Index’ to calculate the market
returns used in the model.10 The abnormal returnTo examine whether shareholders experience
any change in their wealth when new takeover (also called excess return or prediction error) is
the difference between the actual return duringdefense measures are announced, we follow the
conventional event study methodology. This the event period (−20, +20) and the return pre-
dicted from the estimation period:methodology has been widely used in the finan-
cial economics literature (e.g., DeAngelo and
Rice, 1983; Linn and McConnell, 1983). ARjt = Rjt−aˆj−bˆ j Rmt
Recently, it has also become popular in the stra-
tegic management literature (e.g., Mahoney and The abnormal returns for individual stocks are
then averaged across all stocks to obtain averageMahoney, 1993). The purpose of this method is
to estimate the deviation of actual stock returns abnormal returns for each day. The excess returns
for each stock are also compounded over different(consequent upon the announcement of a speci-
fied event) from expected stock returns. We time intervals around announcement date to calcu-
late cumulative abnormal returns. A t-test is per-employ the Market Model and the Market
Adjusted Returns Model to estimate these devi- formed to test whether the average abnormal
returns are significantly different from zero. Theations for each stock.
The Market Model supposes that the return on t-value is obtained by dividing average daily
abnormal returns by its standard deviation calcu-an individual stock is linearly related to the mar-
ket return. The relationship is written as follows: lated from the estimation period.
In order to check the robustness of our results,
we also perform the stock return analysis usingRjt = aj + bjRmt + ejt
the Market Adjusted Returns Model. The model
predicts individual stock return to be equal to thewhere
corresponding market return, or in other words,
Rjt = the continuously compounded return
of stock j in period t; Rjt = Rmt
Rmt = the continuously compounded mar-
ket return in period t; This model is distinct from the Market Model in
the sense that here all stocks are assumed to beaj,bj = security specific and time inde-
pendent parameters; of average risk. The abnormal returns are calcu-
lated as the difference between the actual stock
return and the corresponding market return:
8 The logistic analysis is chosen here because the dependent
variable is a binary, qualitative variable.
9 As the variable Cblock combines both institutional and block-
holders’ shares, we have constructed another variable which
estimates the share of all blockholders other than those held 10 The CBS-Total Return Index is a value-weighted index
representing all listed stocks. It is the only market indexby institutional blockholders. The Herfindahl measure was
calculated by summing squared percentage of shares owned available in the Netherlands which covers all listed companies.
In addition, the index is adjusted for cash dividends.by each blockholder.
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Table 3. Means, medians, standard deviations, and correlations
Variables Mean Median S.D. C1 C3 C5 Cblock Cinst.
C1 30.8 25.5 1.68 1
C3 45.1 42.5 24.9 0.89 1
C5 49.2 49.8 25.8 0.81 0.97 1
Cblock 50.9 55.1 26.5 0.75 0.93 0.98 1
Cinst. 9.9 6.0 12.5 −0.16 −0.02 0.06 0.08 1
The table reports the results of different ownership concentration variables: C1, C3, C5, Cblock and Cinst. represent the percentage
of shares held by the largest blockholder, the three largest blockholders, the five largest blockholders, all blockholders, and
institutional blockholders, respectively. The sample consists of 177 industrial companies listed on the Amsterdam Stock
Exchange in 1992.
ARjt = Rjt−Rmt find that the largest shareholder has more than
25 percent of shares in 52 percent of the firms
in the sample, and more than 50 percent of sharesThe average abnormal returns and cumulative
average abnormal returns are then computed as in 22 percent of the firms. A majority of the
companies has a blockholding in excess of 50described previously.
percent. After searching the identity of these
blockholders, we find that the average shares of
management and family members, companies, andEMPIRICAL RESULTS
individual blockholders are 8 percent, 20 percentOwnership structure
and 5 percent, respectively. The average share of
financial institutions (banks and insuranceA descriptive analysis on Dutch ownership struc-
ture is presented in Table 3. We find that block- companies) in our sample is almost 10 percent.
The combined share of these investors is lessholders hold more than half of all shares in Dutch
companies. The average share of the largest than 25 percent for 90 percent of the companies.
The sample contains 18 companies in whichblockholder is 31 percent, that of the three largest
blockholders is 45 percent, and the average share banks and insurance companies are the only
blockholders. The average share of other insti-of all blockholders together is 51 percent. It
appears that the group with the three largest tutional blockholders is 6 percent.
In Table 4 we present the average ownershipshareholders dominates ownership concentration
of Dutch firms. The correlations between these concentrations of companies with cumulative
defense mechanisms. We also report in the lowervariables are, as expected, very high. Our results
show that ownership concentration in the Nether- panel corresponding t-values testing the difference
in average ownership concentrations. Our resultslands is higher than in the U.S.A., the U.K. and
Japan, but lower than in Sweden.11 The variation show that the concentration of the largest share-
holder for firms without any defense measure iswithin each measure of ownership concentration
is also higher in the Netherlands. The standard almost 13 percentage points higher than that for
firms with only one measure. Similarly, for com-deviation of percentage of shares held by the top
five blockholders in our sample is 26 percent panies with one takeover defense device, the con-
centration of the largest shareholder is 11 percent-compared with Prowse’s (1995) findings of 16
percent in the U.S.A. and the U.K. and 14 percent age points higher than that for firms with two
devices. Both differences in concentration arein Japan.
Analyzing the distribution of shareholdings, we statistically significant. In general, we find that
the lower the ownership concentrations are, the
more takeover defenses companies adopt. This11 Prowse (1995) reports average ownership concentration of
the five largest shareholders to be 25 percent in the U.S.A., phenomenon is valid for all three measures of
21 percent in the U.K. and 33 percent in Japan. According ownership concentration. Our evidence is consist-
to Bergstro¨m and Rydqvist (1990), the average ownership
ent with Bergstro¨m and Rydqvist (1990), whoconcentration of the largest shareholder in Sweden is 43 per-
cent. observe that Swedish firms with high concen-
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Table 4. The difference in ownership concentration of firms with cumulative takeover defenses
Measures of concentration
No. of defenses No. of firms C1 C3 Cblock Cinst.
0 16 48.51 65.21 73.08 7.83
1 52 35.88 53.01 59.78 12.16
2 62 24.99 37.59 41.48 9.36
3 39 28.99 42.24 49.93 9.01
4 8 20.33 27.04 29.99 7.45
t (0, 1) 2.00** 1.91* 2.17** −1.27
t (1, 2) 2.78** 3.46** 3.92** 1.11
t (2, 3) −0.78 −0.96 −1.59 0.13
t (3, 4) 0.95 1.72* 2.02** 0.35
**Statistically significant at the 5% level.
*Statistically significant at the 10% level.
The table reports results of four concentration variables—C1, C3, Cblock and Cinst.—representing the percentage of shares held
by the largest blockholder, the three largest blockholders, all blockholders, and institutional blockholders, respectively. The t-
statistic reported in the lower panel tests for the difference of means between two measures of ownership concentrations.
tration of equity ownership rarely adopt antitake- that the results are generally consistent with ear-
lier findings. The probability of a firm adoptingover devices. These findings suggest that firms
adopt multiple takeover defenses when sharehold- any one takeover defense mechanism is nega-
tively related to ownership concentration. Theings are diffuse.
Table 4 also reports the results for institutional finding is robust to all variables used in comput-
ing ownership concentration, including the loga-blockholders (banks and insurance companies).
The concentration of these institutional share- rithmic transformations of the Herfindahl meas-
ures. The results with institutional concentrationholders does not show any particular relationship
with multiple takeover defenses. The share of variables alone are, however, once again mixed.
these investors in firms with one defense mech-
anism is five percentage points higher than in Wealth effectsfirms without any defense. Afterwards, as insti-
tutional ownership concentration declines, firms The sample here consists of 44 new preferred
defenses announced during 1984–90.13 Table 6adopt a higher number of defenses. These differ-
ences are not statistically significant. presents the cumulated average abnormal returns
based on the Market Model for several intervalsNext, we examine if the general finding on the
negative relationship between ownership concen- in the event period. The results from the aggre-
gate sample indicate that the announcement oftration and defense mechanisms also holds for
individual takeover defenses. The analysis is car- the preferred share defense mechanism is, on
average, associated with a decline in commonried out by performing a logit regression. The
estimated regression coefficient expresses the share price. During the 2-day announcement
period [0, 1], shareholders suffer a statisticallyrelationship between the likelihood of choosing
one particular defense mechanism and a measure significant return decline of 1.18 percent. The
result is not driven by a few outliers as theof firms’ ownership concentration. The results are
presented in Table 5.12 The reported coefficient number of negative abnormal returns dominates
the sample. This is also found to be statisticallyestimates are obtained from running regressions
with one explanatory variable at a time. We find significant at the 5 percent level after conducting
12 Because of space limitation and qualitatively similar find- 13 Three measures could not be included in the sample because
the market model parameters’ estimation period coincidedings, the regression results of only a limited number of
variables are presented. with the event period of a previous measure.
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Table 5. Estimates of logistic regressions relating the likelihood of adopting a specific takeover defense
mechanism to ownership concentration
Priority share Preferred share Depository receipts
Measures of
concentration Intercept Coefficient Intercept Coefficient Intercept Coefficient
C1 0.06 −0.01 0.94** −0.02** 0.40 −0.03**
(0.24) (1.32) (3.45) (2.54) (1.47) (3.46)
C3 0.30 −0.01* 1.40** −0.02** 0.50 0.02**
(0.97) (1.87) (3.99) (3.33) (1.55) (3.16)
Cblock 0.31 −0.01* 1.65** −0.02** 0.37 −0.02**
(0.93) (1.78) (4.26) (3.72) (1.12) (2.67)
Cinst. 0.08 −0.03** 0.23 0.01 −0.67** 0.02*
(0.41) (2.24) (1.18) (1.16) (3.34) (1.95)
LN(C1) 0.63 −0.27 1.89** −0.48** 1.26** −0.55**
(1.17) (1.63) (3.06) (2.58) (2.19) (3.04)
LN(C3) 0.97 −0.33* 2.48** −0.58** 0.94 −0.39**
(1.53) (1.93) (3.06) (2.69) (1.48) (2.21)
LN(Cblock) 0.93 −0.31* 2.66** −0.61** 0.73 −0.32*
(1.48) (1.88) (3.16) (2.82) (1.18) (1.93)
LN(Cinst.) 0.19 −0.27** 0.15 0.15 −0.85** 0.26**
(0.85) (2.36) (0.66) (1.31) (3.43) (2.28)
Hblock −0.06 −0.90 0.76** −2.22** 0.11 −3.51**
(0.31) (1.09) (3.54) (2.58) (0.50) (3.15)
Hinst. −0.14 −5.41 0.29* 6.34 −0.45** 1.55
(0.87) (1.04) (1.77) (1.13) (2.68) (0.35)
**Statistically significant at the 5% level.
*Statistically significant at the 10% level.
The concentration variables are defined as follows. The variables C1, C3, Cblock, and Cinst. represent the percentage of shares
held by the largest blockholder, three largest blockholders, all blockholders, and institutional blockholders, respectively. The
LN and H variables are logarithmic transformed and Herfindahl concentration measures, respectively. Absolute t-values are
shown in parentheses beneath each coefficient.
Table 6. Cumulative abnormal returns around the announcement of defense with preferred share issue
Return intervals
(−20, −1) (0, 1) (−1, 1) (0, 5) (−20, 5) (0, 20)
Full sample 1.06 −1.18** −1.17** −2.27** −1.52 −3.56**
(n = 44) (0.76) (2.67) (2.18) (2.97) (0.96) (2.49)
Create possibility −3.11 1.23* 0.71 0.60 −2.51 1.43
(n = 17) (1.41) (1.77) (0.83) (0.01) (1.00) (0.64)
Grant option 0.50 −0.41 −0.10 −0.42 0.08 −2.81
(n = 10) (0.22) (0.57) (0.12) (0.33) (0.03) (1.20)
Actual issue 4.93* −4.09** −1.70* −6.40** 1.21 −9.64**
(n = 17) (1.88) (4.94) (1.68) (4.46) (0.41) (3.59)
First issue 4.36 −4.18** −2.20* −7.03** 1.42 −11.73**
(n = 13) (1.32) (4.00) (1.72) (3.88) (0.38) (3.46)
Second issue 6.78** −3.79** −0.09 −4.37** 0.52 −2.85
(n = 4) (2.30) (4.06) (0.08) (2.71) (0.16) (0.94)
**Statistically significant at the 5% level.
*Statistically significant at the 10% level.
Abnormal returns are computed employing the Market Model, and are shown as a percentage. Results are presented for six
different intervals. The numbers in parentheses below the coefficients are absolute t-values.
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a sign test (Z-statistic = 2.34). Over the 6-day of the preferred share issue. This increase in
share price could be an indication of a takeoverpostannouncement period, the cumulative abnor-
mal return is −2.27 percent (with a t-value of attempt that eventually led managers to issue the
preferred shares.17 Interestingly, the post-−2.97).14
Although the above result tends to support announcement periods indicate a significant
decline in shareholders’ wealth. This declinethe managerial entrenchment hypothesis, further
analysis of the sample reveals some interesting might provide an estimate of the lost premium
incurred by common shareholders—since thefindings. We split the aggregate sample into three
subsamples based on the three steps followed in chance of eventual takeover was eliminated by
actually issuing preferred shares.18 Our finding isthe issuing process. With the announcement of
the first step towards defense (creating the possi- consistent with prior studies showing that stock
prices increase with takeover bids but then declinebility of preferred share issue), a positive and
statistically significant stock price effect is if they do not materialize. In sum, the evidence
provided here suggests that, although defenseobserved. This evidence does not support the
managerial entrenchment hypothesis. Shareholders measures are beneficial to a certain extent, the
benefits do not remain when they are used todo not experience any wealth decline from the
charter amendment leading to takeover defense. fend off takeover attempts.
We also examine whether there is a differenceOn the contrary, they appear to benefit as there
is a signficant increase in stock returns (1.23% in the results between the first preferred share
issue and a subsequent issue. The issue samplein 2 days).15 All other postannouncement intervals
also reveal positive (but not significant) price is further divided into a subsample of 13 compa-
nies that issued preferred shares for the firstincreases. This result indicates that defense meas-
ures are indeed adopted allowing shareholders to time and a subsample of four companies with a
subsequent issue. We find that the first issue isbenefit from increased takeover premiums. The
almost negligible stock price impact with respect more damaging for shareholders. The abnormal
return in the 5-day postannouncement period isto the second step announcement is not surprising,
since granting a purchase option to a friendly −7.03 percent (t-value = −3.88) in case of the
first-time issue, compared to −4.37 percent (t-party is an obvious outcome of the charter amend-
ment. value = −2.71) in case of a subsequent issue. This
difference is statistically very significant (with aAnother interesting finding is obtained when
we look at the third step of the defense process. t-value of −6.24).19 Other postannouncement
return intervals show similar results.The negative announcement effect of the aggre-
gate sample is in fact determined by the issue
of the preferred share itself. We find that the
announcement of a preferred share issue is asso-
ciated with a strong excess decline in stock
17 The increase in stock price followed by a decline on thereturns (−4.09%), which is statistically significant
announcement of share issue could also be seen as an indi-(with a t-value of −4.94). For the 6-day period
cation of the breakdown of takeover negotiations. To verify[0, 5], the excess decline in shareholders’ wealth this, we searched the financial press throughout the event
period, and found no report on any negotiation. This, ofamounts to 6.40 percent.16 However, we find a
course, does not rule out the possibility of undisclosed infor-significant price increase before the announcement
mation.
18 We also searched the financial press to check if any specific
event followed the announcement, but were unable to find any.
19 We also investigate whether the market reaction varies with14 The finding is robust as the two other methodologies (the
Market Adjusted Returns Model and the Market Model using firms’ ownership concentration. The sample is divided into
three portfolios: portfolio 1 contains firms with the lowestpostevent period data) show that stock prices decline by 1.50
percent and 1.85 percent, respectively. concentration, portfolio 3 contains those with the highest
concentration, and portfolio 2 is between them. We do not15 The Market Adjusted Returns Model and the Market Model
using postevent period data show that stock prices increase find statistically significant differences in cumulative abnormal
returns among these portfolios. Therefore, the results are notby 1.33 percent and 1.27 percent, respectively.
16 Once again, the results are materially indifferent to one reported here. A cross-sectional regression between ownership
structure and announcement period abnormal returns alsoparticular methodology used in calculating abnormal returns.
The Market Adjusted Returns Model and the Market Model yields insignificant results. Our analysis, however, should be
interpreted with caution because the sample size is small andusing postevent period data also show a decline in stock
returns (−5.06% and −5.62%, respectively). only one defense mechanism is examined.
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CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS conflict between shareholders and managers.
Other such mechanisms include the capital mar-
ket, the market for corporate control, the mana-
This paper empirically analyzes the relationship gerial labor market and the product market. Simi-
lar to Walsh and Seward (1990), we believe thatof takeover defenses with firms’ ownership struc-
ture and shareholders’ wealth. A sample of Dutch much can be learned about one control mech-
anism when it is analyzed in and around anotherindustrial companies is selected for the study. The
Dutch scenario is particularly interesting because mechanism. Managers in the Netherlands seem
to be immune from the disciplinary threat of thealmost all listed companies have adopted multiple
takeover defenses. market for corporate control. Since the takeover
market is just one disciplinary mechanism, weWe find that firms with a relatively lower
ownership concentration are the ones with a larger would expect other control mechanisms to be at
work too. Our results in this paper demonstratenumber of defense measures. Our analysis sug-
gests that firms with disperse ownership adopt this—for example, monitoring by concentrated
ownership. As Prowse (1995) points out, concen-more defense tactics. The analysis also shows
that the likelihood for a firm to adopt takeover trated shareholdings are important because they
provide investors with both the incentive and thedefenses is inversely and significantly related to
ownership concentration. The result is robust to ability to monitor and influence the management.
Without such concentration, again other mech-different ways of measuring ownership concen-
tration. Overall, our evidence is consistent with anisms of corporate control must be relied upon.
It is usually believed that institutional investorsthe hypothesis that company management is more
likely to adopt defensive measures when a firm find it in their best interest to more effectively
monitor company managers. In the U.S.A., insti-is characterized by diffuse shareholdings. We do
not find any significant relationship associated tutional shareholdings have increased over the
last years, and a few institutional shareholderswith institutional stock ownership. The evidence
provided here, therefore, does not strongly sup- have emerged as very active monitors. The find-
ings of Duggal and Millar (1994) suggest thatport the hypothesis that institutional shareholders
provide better monitoring than other blockholders. researchers should better split aggregate insti-
tutional ownership into different categories toWe also conduct a stock return analysis in the
case of defense with preferred share—the most obtain correct results. The results of this study
show that in the Netherlands institutional share-widely used takeover defense device in recent
years in the Netherlands. Our results indicate holders like banks and insurance companies do
not have large holdings, and these have notwo opposing effects of defense on shareholders’
wealth: in one situation, the stock market reacts relationship with the adoption of antitakeover
devices. An implication of this finding is thatpositively, seemingly to allow managers to bar-
gain for a higher premium in takeover bids. In active monitoring by institutional shareholders
may not take place in many countries. It is highlyanother situation, the stock market reacts nega-
tively as potential takeover attempt appears to unlikely that Dutch institutional shareholders lack
the expertise and the ability to serve as effectivebe eliminated.
Alternative disciplinary mechanisms have been monitors. Rather, the presence of small stakes
may explain why passivity remains the norm. Itan area of extensive scrutiny. In this paper, we
document that low (high) ownership concen- is also possible that active institutional monitoring
may not be a representation of the general patterntration is associated with greater (smaller) use of
antitakeover devices which affect the functioning in the U.S.A.
There are many types of defense measures, andof the market for corporate control. We also
provide evidence on the existence of positive and their effects also depend on situation like the
manner in which a particular device is introduced.negative share price effects of takeover defense
measures. Some implications of our findings are Our analysis shows that it is difficult to say a
priori whether defense measures are good or baddiscussed below.
The empirical results obtained in this study for shareholders. Even takeover defenses that are
approved by shareholders have the potential toreconfirm the need of analyzing firms’ ownership
structure as a mechanism to control the agency reduce shareholder wealth. This lack of conclu-
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